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Abstract
In this paper we introduce the plurality kth social choice function selecting an alterna-
tive, which is ranked kth in the social ranking following the number of top positions of
alternatives in the individual ranking of voters. As special case the plurality 1st is the
same as the well-known plurality rule. Concerning individual manipulability, we show
that the larger k the more preference profiles are individually manipulable. We also
provide maximal non-manipulable domains for the plurality kth rules. These results
imply analogous statements on the single non-transferable vote rule. We propose a
decomposition of social choice functions based on plurality kth rules, which we apply
for determining non-manipulable subdomains for arbitrary social choice functions.
We further show that with the exception of the plurality rule all other plurality kth
rules are group manipulable, i.e. coordinated misrepresentation of individual rankings
are beneficial for each group member, with an appropriately selected tie-breaking rule
on the set of all profiles.
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1 Introduction
The plurality rule selecting the alternative receiving the maximum number of votes
is the most commonly used social choice function (or voting rule) in real life. The
plurality rule is also supported by several axiomatic characterizations starting with
Richelson (1978) and Roberts (1991). Sanver (2009) determined the non-manipulable
domains for the plurality rule. Furthermore, the plurality rule has been derived as the
solution of reasonable optimization problems by Nitzan (1981), Elkind et al. (2015),
and Bednay et al. (2017) etc. In particular, Bednay et al. (2017) introduced and derived
the reverse-plurality rule, which selects the alternative receiving the fewest number of
votes. The plurality rule and the reverse plurality rules are special cases of the plurality
kth rules introduced in this paper. The plurality kth rule selects the alternative receiving
the kmost number of votes.We resolve ties based on an exogenously given tie-breaking
rule.
In multi-winner voting, k alternatives/candidates are selected. For instance, situa-
tions where first a shortlist of candidates is created so that in a subsequent round judges
can select thewinning candidate.Another example is the formation of committees. The
problem requires that voters express preferences over the possiblewinning k-sized sets,
which can be too demanding for each voter since the number of k-sized sets becomes
easily very large to be ranked by individuals or can require communicating too much
information (see for instance Kilgour (2018)). Therefore, multi-winner voting rules
usually need from the voters to reveal only their preferences over the set of alternatives
as in case of single-winner voting rules. The loss of information makes the investi-
gation of the manipulability of multi-winner voting rules more intriguing. Therefore,
more information has to be elicited from the revealed preferences (e.g. Lang and Xia
(2016)). Many multi-winner voting rules are simply derived from single-winning vot-
ing rules by picking the best k alternatives determined by the respective single-winning
voting rules. Choosing the appropriate multi-winner voting rule depends on the prob-
lem. Elkind et al. (2017) distinguish between excellence-based election, selecting a
diverse committee and proportional representation type multi-winner election prob-
lems. For our analysis, the first criterion which focuses on selecting individually best
alternatives, is relevant.
The simplest multi-winner voting rule is the so-called single non-transferable vote
(SNTV) rule, which can be regarded as an extension of the plurality rule. Plurality
based multi-winner voting rules are investigated by Faliszewski et al. (2018). The
choices of the plurality, plurality 2nd, . . ., plurality kth rules are the same as that of the
SNTV rule selecting a k-sized set. The plurality kth rule basically selects the alternative
just making it into the k-sized committee, while the plurality k + 1th rule determines
the alternative just not making it in there. Clearly, investigating the manipulability of
these rules are simpler than that of the SNTV rule. We assume that when comparing
two k-sized sets each voter only cares about the alternatives appearing in the symmetric
difference of these two sets. We will establish a link between the manipulability of the
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plurality kth rule and the associated multi-winner voting rule selecting the alternatives
obtaining the k highest plurality scores.
We order/arrange the plurality kth rules based on the proportion ofmanipulable pro-
files, an approach propagated by Kelly (1985) and Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999).
From the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (1973/75) it follows that the plurality kth
rules are manipulable. Concerning individual manipulability, the proportion of manip-
ulable profiles increases in k. The importance of the plurality kth rules is stressed by
the observation that any voting rule can be decomposed based on plurality kth rules.
Furthermore, we can arrive in this way to a new domain which is maximal with respect
to non-manipulability.
Our latter result can be compared with (Maus et al. 2007a, b). They determine under
certain combinations of basic properties the voting rules with the smallest number of
manipulable profiles. In particular, for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective social
choice functions Maus et al. (2007a) establish that the unanimity rules with status
quo have the minimal number of manipulable profiles. Maus et al. (2007b) derive the
lower bound on the number of manipulable profiles by imposing assumptions on the
number of voters and alternatives (they require that the number of voters is at least as
large as the number of alternatives). They also find that social choice functions exhibit
a trade off between minimizing manipulability and treating alternatives neutrally.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework. Section 3
contains results on individual manipulability. Section 4 describes the maximal non-
manipulable subdomains. Section 5 presents the decomposition and Sect. 6 concludes.
Finally, the “Appendix” contains further mathematical findings concerning the group
manipulability of the plurality kth rules.
2 The framework
The set of alternatives is A = {1, . . . ,m} with |A| = m ≥ 2. The set of voters is
N = {1, . . . , n}. The set of all strict preference relations (or linear orderings1) on A
is denoted by P . The set of all preference profiles is denoted by Pn . If ∈ Pn and
i ∈ N , i denotes the preference ordering of voter i over A.
Definition 1 A social choice function (SCF) or a voting rule is amapping f : Pn → A
that selects a winning alternative for each preference profile.
Note that our definition of a SCF does not allow for possible ties. In case of ties, a
fixed tie-breaking rule will be used. A tie-breaking rule τ : Pn → P maps preference
profiles to linear orderings on A. The tie-breaking rule is used only when a unique
winner is not determined by the formula. If there are more alternatives chosen by a for-
mula “almost” specifying a SCF, then the highest ranked alternative is selected, based
on the given tie-breaking rule among tied alternatives. A tie-breaking rule is called
anonymous if it is invariant to the ordering of voters’ preferences or to the labeling of
voters. For instance, the simplest anonymous tie-breaking rule assigns to each profile
the same exogenously given ordering of alternatives. It is worth emphasizing that we
1 A linear ordering is an irreflexive, transitive and total binary relation.
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only consider deterministic tie-breaking rules. For some results, we need a special
class of tie-breaking rules which we refer to as tie-order preserving ones meaning
that if at a profile ∈ Pn alternatives T ⊆ A are tied at consecutive places and by
changing voter i’s preference to ′i∈ P at profile (′i ,−i ) alternatives T ′ ⊆ A are
tied at consecutive places, then τ orders the alternatives T ∩T ′ in the same way at both
profiles. For instance, any constant tie-breaking rule (i.e. ties are determined based on
an exogenously given linear ordering of alternatives) is tie-order preserving.
The reverse-plurality rule fτ selects the alternative which is the fewest number of
times on the top and uses the tie-breaking rule τ to resolve ties when required. The
following class of rules range from the reverse-plurality rule to the plurality rule.
Definition 2 Rank the alternatives based on their plurality scores and employ a tie-
breaking rule τ in case of ties, to obtain a linear ordering of the alternatives. The
plurality kth rule f (k)τ selects the kth placed alternative in the obtained linear ordering.
Clearly the plurality rule is the plurality 1st rule and the reverse-plurality rule is the
plurality mth rule.
We now define multi-winner voting rules, which in our setting choose k alternatives
out of the m alternatives. Let C(k) be set of all k-sized subsets of A.
Definition 3 A mapping g : Pn → C(k) that selects the winning k-sized subset of
alternatives is called a multi-winner voting rule (MWVR).
We will consider the single non-transferable vote rule (referred to as the SNTV
rule), which is a straightforward extension of the plurality rule to a MWVR.
Definition 4 For a given k = 1, . . . ,m, the single non-transferable vote rule g(k)τ :
Pn → C(k) selects the first k placed alternatives obtained by ranking the alternatives
based on their plurality scores and employing the tie-breaking rule τ to resolve possible
ties.
Note that g(k)τ = { f (1)τ , f (2)τ , . . . , f (k)τ }.We define below the individualmanipulability
of SCFs. Consider a preference profile (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn .
Definition 5 An SCF f : Pn → A is manipulable by voter i ∈ N at (1, . . . ,n) ∈
Pn if
∃ ′i∈ P such that f (′i ,−i ) i f (i ,−i ).
An SCF f : Pn → A is manipulable at (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn if there exists a voter
i ∈ N who can manipulate f at (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn .
We now define the manipulability of a MWVR. This requires a notion about how
a voter compares two possible sets of winners of cardinality k. One possibility is that
each voter compares two possible sets of winners lexicographically with respect to its
preference relation. We believe this is a natural assumption, for instance in situations
where a voter is represented by a single candidate or when the MWVR determines a
preselection process and the single winner is chosen in another independent round.2
2 Allowing the voters to express their preferences on k-sized sets easily results in an intractable problem.
123
On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions:…
We will denote by L the lexicographic extension of  to the class of k-sized sets of
alternatives. In particular, for any B = {b1, . . . , bk} ⊆ A and any C = {c1, . . . , ck} ⊆
A, where we assumewithout loss of generality that b1  b2  . . .  bk and c1  c2 
. . .  ck , we have B L C if and only if there exists an l ∈ M such that bl  cl and
b j = c j for all j = 1, . . . , l − 1. Finally, we will carry out the comparison of two k-
sized sets B andC by comparing B \C andC \B based on the lexicographic extension
of . Formally, we write B D C if B \ C L C \ B. In our framework the sets
B \C and C \ B to be compared will be singletons, which correspond to an alternative
entering the selected k-sized set and an alternative exiting the k-sized set through
manipulations. It may be reasonable in many contexts to assume that the comparison
has to be carried out based on the changes in a set. Since then only singletons have
to be compared the investigation of the manipulability of the SNTV rule will become
quite simple and very similar to the investigation of the manipulability of the plurality
kth rules. It may be reasonable in many contexts to assume that the comparison has
to be carried out based on the changes in a set and can be considered as a kind of
independence or separability property.
For MWVRs we also introduce individual manipulability.
Definition 6 AMWVR g : Pn → C(k) ismanipulable by voter i ∈ N at (1, . . . ,n)
∈ Pn if
∃ ′i∈ P such that g(′i ,−i ) Di g(i ,−i ).
A MWVR g : Pn → C(k) is manipulable at (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn if there exists a
voter i ∈ N who can manipulate g at (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn .
Concerning individual manipulability, we will investigate the manipulability of
subdomains for which we introduce the following notion.
Definition 7 An SCF f : Pn → A or a MWVR g : Pn → C(k) is non-manipulable
on a subdomain D ⊆ Pn if for voters’ preference profiles in D none of them can
manipulate by misrepresenting its preference relation without leaving the preference
domain D.
Hence, a subdomain is non-manipulable if stayingwithinD, individualmanipulation is
impossible. Note that non-manipulable subdomains exist since if D is ‘disconnected’
or ‘sparse enough’ so that none of the voters can change their preference relation
individually in a way that for any given profile in D the resulting profile remains in
D, then D is a non-manipulable subdomain for any SCF. Maximal non-manipulable
subdomains in which each agent faced the same restriction imposed on the set of its
admissible preferences have been determined for the Borda count by Barbie et al.
(2006) and for the plurality rule by Sanver (2009).
In order to prevent us from investigating ‘disconnected’ subdomains we introduce
the following notion.
Definition 8 AdomainD ⊆ Pn is called connected if for any profiles,′∈ Pn there
exists a sequence of profiles (0),(1), . . . ,(l)∈ D such that (0)=, (l)=′ and
two subsequent profiles of the sequence differ only in the preference relation of one
voter.
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Informally, the connectedness of a domain means that from any profile of a domain
any other profile of the same domain can be reached by a sequence of individual
manipulations.
The most obvious index of manipulability, the so-called Nitzan-Kelly index (NKI)
introduced by Nitzan (1985) and Kelly (1988), divides the number of manipulable
profiles by the number of all profiles. We will consider two versions of the NKI: one
assumes the impartial culture (IC),while the other one the anonymous impartial culture
(AIC) of preference profiles. In the former case (IC) voters’ preferences are chosen
independently and based on the uniform distribution above the set of all profiles (i.e.
each preference relation is assigned independently and equally likely to the voters),
while in the latter case (AIC) only the number of occurrences of a preference relation
in a preference profile matters and not their distribution between voters (i.e. each
anonymous preference profile is equally likely).3 In particular, label the different
preferences from 1 to m! and let n1, . . . , nm! be the respective number of preferences
1, . . . ,m! for a givenprofile.Then in case of anonymousprofiles only these numbers
matter, while the assignment of these preferences to the voters does not.
Henceforth, we shall denote by Ma = {i ∈ N | a = t(i )} the set of agents with
top alternative a ∈ A, where t(i ) stands for the top alternative of i . In addition,
let rτ (, j) ∈ A be the j th ranked alternative by the plurality rule with a given tie-
breaking rule τ and s (, a) be the number of top positions of alternative a ∈ A in
case of ∈ Pn , i.e. the plurality score of alternative a. Furthermore, let pτ (, j) =
s (, rτ (, j)) be the plurality score of the j th ranked alternative.
3 Individual manipulability
In this section we turn to the individual manipulability of plurality kth rules and
we start with some general and simple observations. Let a = rτ (, k − 1), b =
rτ (, k) and c = rτ (, k + 1). With a slight abuse of notation let a be undefined
if k = 1 and c be undefined if k = m. Note that by individual manipulation the
relative difference in plurality scores can change by at most 2. In particular, we have
a successful manipulation of the plurality kth rule by moving the k − 1th ranked
alternative (in case of k ≥ 2) into the kth position
1. If a leads by two and a voter having a as the top alternative reveals b as its top
alternative assuming that τ gives priority to b over a for the respective profile,
2. If a leads by one and a voter having a as the top alternative reveals again b as its
top alternative, however now we have to assume that τ should give priority to a
over other potentially tied alternatives,
3. If a is tied with b, while c has a lower score, then the type ofmanipulation described
in Point 2 still works,
4. If a, b, c are all tied and assuming that τ gives priority to a over lower ranked tied
alternatives, a voter having alternative c as its top alternative and preferring a to b
reveals b as its top alternative.
3 For a detailed discussion of the IC vs. AIC assumptions see Eǧecioǧlu and Giritligil (2013).
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Table 1 Moving a manipulation possibility downwards
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a a a b b c c
b d b d a d b
c b d a d a d
d d c c c b a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c a a c b c c
b d b d a d b
a b d a d a d
d d c b c b a
Since we are moving in the above described cases the k−1th ranked alternative into a
lower rankedwinning position, we are speaking about downwardsmanipulation.More
generally, downwards manipulation can be extended to the case when a k− j th ranked
alternative is ‘degraded’ to the kth ranked alternative by benefiting the manipulating
voter.
Now we turn to the question whether a successful manipulation of the plurality kth
rule bymoving the k+1th ranked alternative (in case of k ≤ m−1) into the kth position
is possible. Since the plurality score of b can only be decreased by a voter having b on
top, which is not beneficial for that voter, this type of upwards manipulation has less
cases than downwards manipulation. More specifically, we have the following three
potentially successful upwards manipulation possibilities.
5. If b leads by one against c, then and a voter preferring c to bwith another top ranked
alternative reveals c as its top alternative (τ can be set appropriately depending on
whether the third alternative is tied with b or not).
6. If a leads by at least one and b is tied with c, then a voter preferring c to b with
another top ranked alternative reveals again c as its top alternative (in this case we
have even less restrictions in choosing the tie-breaking rule for the manipulated
profile).
7. If a, b and c are all tied, then a voter with top alternative a and preferring c to b
reveals b as its top alternative (the tie-breaking rule should not change the ordering
of alternatives potentially tied with c).
Upwards manipulation can be extended to the case when a k + lth ranked alternative
is ‘upgraded’ to the kth ranked alternative by benefiting the manipulating voter.
First, we show that the plurality second rule is manipulable on at least as many
profiles as the plurality rule. We motivate the main step of our proof by the example
shown in Table 1 in which m = 4 and n = 7. The plurality rule is manipulable at the
profile shown on the left-hand side of Table 1 by voter 7. In order to maintain that
voter 7 manipulates by making b the winning alternative instead of a for the plurality
2nd rule, we make the top alternative c of voter 7 the plurality winner by switching the
positions of a with c and bwith c for the first voters having a and b on top, respectively.
The resulting profile is shown on the right-hand side of Table 1 in which voter 7 can
manipulate the plurality 2nd rule. The main point of this example is that we associate
to the manipulable profile for the plurality rule another manipulable profile for the
plurality 2nd rule in which the same voter manipulates in exactly the same way.
We shall denote by Dk and Dak the set of profiles and anonymous profiles, respec-
tively, on which the plurality kth rule is individually manipulable.
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Proposition 1 Assume that m ≥ 3, n ≥ m + 2, and τ is a given tie-breaking rule.
Considering individual manipulability, there exists a tie-breaking rule τ ′ such that the
NKI of the plurality rule f (1)τ is smaller than or equal to the NKI of the plurality 2nd
rule f (2)
τ ′ on both the IC and the AIC, where in the latter case anonymous tie-breaking
rules have to be assumed.
Proof We will construct an injection f : D1 → D2. Pick an arbitrary profile  at
which the plurality rule is manipulable.
We label the alternatives such that |Ma1 | ≥ |Ma2 | ≥ · · · ≥ |Mam | and that in case
of equalities they follow the ordering given by τ . Order the voters such that the |Ma1 |
voters with a1 on the top come first, next the |Ma2 | voters with a2 on the top follow,
and so forth. The ordering of voters having the same top alternative should be kept.We
shall denote the reordered profile by σ , where σ stands for the respective bijection.
Since the plurality rule is manipulable atσ there exist i, j ∈ A and a voter q ∈ N
such that either |Ma1 | = |Mai | or |Ma1 | = |Mai | + 1, q ∈ Maj , and q prefers ai to a1
and can enforce outcome ai by revealing a preference orderingwith ai as its top-ranked
alternative. Select i , j , and q so that, following the respective lexicographic ordering,
they are as small as possible. We exchange the preference ordering of voter q with
that of the last voter having also a j as the top alternative if this is not already the case.
With a slight abuse of notation we shall denote the obtained permutation still by σ .
Note that manipulability requires that σ has at least three different top alternatives.
Our strategywill be tomake alternative am the clear pluralitywinner and tomaintain
the ranking of the other alternatives based on their respective number of top positions
such that voter q can make ai the plurality 2nd rule winner by ‘overtaking’ a1. We
shall denote by l the smallest positive integer for which
– lk = max
{|Mak | − l, 1
}
for all k = 1, . . . ,m − 1,
– lm = l1 + · · · + lk−1 and
– |Ma1 | − l1 < |Mam | + lm ,
where n ≥ m + 2 is a sufficient condition to guarantee that the last inequality can
be achieved independently from . Then we change the respective number of top
positions of the alternatives to
|Ma1 | − l1, . . . , |Mam−1 | − lm−1, |Mam | + lm,
where ak and am should exchange their positions in the preference relations of the
first lk voters in Mak for all k = 1, . . . ,m − 1. We shall denote the obtained profile
by ′σ . In the special case of |Ma1 | − l1 = |Mai | − li we set the tie-breaking rule τ ′
at ′σ so that alternative a1 is the most preferred one among the alternatives it is tied
with. We emphasize that by our construction any alternative that was a top alternative
of at least one voter in σ remains also a top alternative of at least one voter in ′σ .
The remaining at least one voter with the respective top alternative in ′σ serves as a
separator so that σ can be reconstructed from ′σ .
Thereafter, since σ is a bijection we have defined an injection f : D1 → D2 and
our result on the Nitzan-Kelly index on the IC follows. Finally, to arrive to the same
statement on the AIC we just have to take into consideration that for anonymous SCFs
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Table 2 Moving a manipulation possibility downwards
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a a a b b c c
b d b d a d b
c b d a d a d
d d c c c b a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a a d b d c d
b d b d a d b
c b a a b a c
d d c c c b a
the AIC is basically related to a special ordering of preference relations. In particular,
the ordering of profiles can be also obtained in two steps: first, order the profiles
decreasingly based on their plurality scores, and second identical preferences should
follow each other consecutively. 
Second, we show that the reverse plurality rule is manipulable on at least as many
profiles as the plurality m − 1th rule. We motivate the main step of our proof by the
example shown in Table 2 in which m = 4 and n = 7. The plurality m − 1th rule
chooses alternative c for a tie-breaking rule preferring b to c at the profile shown on
the left-hand side of Table 2. The profile is manipulable by the first five voters for a
tie-breaking rule preferring b over c and c over a in the respectivemanipulated profiles.
Let us pick the first voter with the m − 2nd highest plurality score, that is voter 4. In
order to maintain that voter 4 manipulates by making b the winning alternative instead
of c for the reverse plurality rule, we make the top alternative b of voter 4 the plurality
m − 1th winner by switching the positions of a with d, b with d and c with d for the
last voters having a, b and c on top, respectively. The resulting profile is shown on
the right-hand side of Table 2 in which voter 4 can manipulate the plurality m − 1th
rule. Now voter 4 can manipulate the reverse plurality rule by revealing a preference
relation having c on top. The main point is that voter 4 can manipulate the reverse
plurality rule at the profile on the right-hand side of Table 2 in the same way as at the
profile on the left-hand side of Table 2.
The proof of Proposition 2 will be quite similar to the proof of Proposition 1. How-
ever, in the previous proof we had upwards manipulation, whereas in the respective
main part of the proof of our next proposition we will employ downwards manipula-
tion.
Proposition 2 Assume that m ≥ 3, n ≥ m + 2, and τ is a given tie-breaking rule.
Considering individual manipulability, there exists a tie-breaking rule τ ′ such that the
plurality m−1th rule f (m−1)τ has not a larger NKI than the reverse-plurality rule f (m)τ ′
on both the IC and the AIC cases, where in the latter case anonymous tie-breaking
rules have to be assumed.
Proof We will construct an injection f : Dm−1 → Dm . Pick an arbitrary profile  at
which the plurality m − 1th rule is manipulable.
We label the alternatives such that |Ma1 | ≥ |Ma2 | ≥ · · · ≥ |Mam | and that in
case of equalities they follow the ordering given by τ . Order the voters such that the
|Ma1 | voters with a1 on the top come first, next the |Ma2 | voters with a2 on the top
follow, and so forth. The ordering of voters having the same top alternative should be
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kept. We shall denote the reordered profile by σ , where σ stands for the respective
permutation.
Since the plurality m − 1th rule is manipulable at σ there exist i, j ∈ A and a
voter q ∈ N such that q ∈ Maj , and q prefers ai to am−1 and can enforce outcome
ai . In particular, either i = m (and then j < m − 1) in case of upwards manipulation
or i < m − 1 in case of downwards manipulation. In the former case q reveals a
preference ordering with ai as its top alternative, while in the latter case q reveals a
preference orderingwith am−1 as its top alternative. Select i , j , and q so that, following
the respective lexicographic ordering, they are as small as possible, which implies the
choice of downwards manipulation if both are possible. We exchange the preference
ordering of voter q with that of the first voter having also a j as the top alternative if
this is not already the case. With a slight abuse of notation we will denote the obtained
permutation still by σ .
We distinguish between two different cases. In Case A we assume that the down-
wards manipulability (i.e. i < m − 1) of the plurality m − 1th rule is possible at σ ,
which requires that |Mam−1 | ≤ |Mai | ≤ |Mam−1 | + 2. In Case B we assume that the
downwards manipulability of the plurality m − 1th rule is not possible at σ (i.e.
i = m), and therefore only upwards manipulabilty is feasible.
We start with Case A. Our strategy will be to ensure a lead of alternative am against
alternative am−1 in the number of top positions by at least 1 voter. Then voter q can
make ai the winner of the reverse-plurality rule by ‘overtaking’ am−1. We shall denote
by l the smallest positive integer for which
– lk = max
{|Mak | − l, 1
}
for all k = 1, . . . ,m − 1,
– lm = l1 + · · · + lk−1 and
– |Mam−1 | − lm−1 < |Mam | + lm .
Then we change the respective number of top positions of the alternatives to
|Ma1 | − l1, . . . , |Mam−1 | − lm−1, |Mam | + lm,
where ak and am should exchange their positions in the preference relations of the last
lk voters in Mak for all k = 1, . . . ,m − 1. We shall denote the obtained profile by ′σ .
In the special case of |Mai | − li = |Mam−1 | − lm−1 we set the tie-breaking rule τ ′ at
′σ so that alternative am−1 is the least preferred one among the alternatives it is tied
with. Note that downwards manipulation of the plurality m − 1th rule is not possible
at σ if |Ma1 | = |Ma2 | = cldots = |Mam |. Taking into account that n ≥ m + 2,
|Ma1 | > |Mam | and |Ma1 | could be reduced to one, we have l ∈
{
1, . . . , |Ma1 | − 1
}
,
which in turn implies that l is well-defined. By the construction of ′σ all alternatives
being at least twice on top in σ remain at least once on top in ′σ . Since these
alternatives are separated in ′σ by a certain number of preferences with am as their
top alternatives it is straightforward to get back σ from ′σ .
We continue with Case B in which only the upward manipulation of  is possible.
Then any voter in Mam−1 can manipulate the reverse-plurality rule by revealing a
preference relation with am on top. Hence, ′ =  = f () and the reverse-plurality
rule is manipulable at .
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Since only Case B produces profiles ′ in which manipulation can happen only
between am−1 and am , we can deduce from ′ whether it has been derived through
either Case A or B. Therefore, the constructed f is a bijection.
To see that our statement is valid under the IC assumptionwe reorder the preferences
by (σ ′)−1 to obtain the desired profile′. Since for any two profiles inDm−1 belonging
to the same anonymous class (i.e. associated with the same profile inDam−1) different
permutations have to be applied in the beginning of the proof, we have defined an
injection f : Dm−1 → Dm . 
For formulating an analogous statement for the SNTV rules it will be helpful to
define the domain of profiles, which consists of the upwards manipulable domains.
Therefore, we shall denote by Uk and Uak the set of profiles and anonymous profiles,
respectively, on which the plurality kth rule is individually upwards manipulable.
Proposition 3 Assume that m ≥ 3, n ≥ m + 2 and τ is a given tie-breaking rule.
Considering individual manipulability, there exists a tie-breaking rule τ ′ such that the
plurality kth rule f (k)τ , where k = 2, . . . ,m − 2 has a smaller NKI on IC and AIC
than the plurality k+1th rule f (k+1)
τ ′ , where in the latter case anonymous tie-breaking
rules have to be assumed.
Proof First, we construct an injection f : Uk → Uk+1. Pick an arbitrary profile  at
which the plurality kth rule is upwards manipulable. This can be done in an analogous
way to the proof of Proposition 1. Note that profiles like in Case B in the proof of
Proposition 2 do not have to be treated separately.
Second, to extend f to Dk we have to deal with the profiles in Dk \ Uk . Note that
these purely downwards manipulable profiles can be handled in an analogous way as
Case A in the proof of Proposition 2.
Finally, whether the images of the profiles are obtained through either upwards or
downwards manipulation can be easily recognized by checking were the transformed
preferences can be found, that is either there are the first or last lk preferences in the
image for any k = 1, . . . ,m − 1. 
Remark 1 The “antidictatorial rule”, which chooses the worst alternative of a fixed
voter, is manipulable at each profile.
Remark 2 We have shown that individual manipulability, i.e. the number of manipu-
lable profiles increases as we move from the plurality 1st rule to the plurality mth rule
by varying k. We further show in the “Appendix” that all plurality kth rules, except the
plurality 1st rule, are group manipulable. It is important to observe that the plurality
1st rule, like other standard scoring rules, satisfies the condition of positive or non-
negative responsiveness.4 This condition requires that if an alternative w is chosen at
some preference profile and the position of w improves in the ranking of some voter
while holding the ranking of all other alternatives fixed in this voter’s preference rela-
tion, thenw is also selected at themodified preference profile. It is easy to show that all
plurality kth rules with k > 1 violate positive responsiveness. This condition means
4 SeeArrow (1963) (Page 25).Wewould like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the relationship
between manipulability of plurality kth rules and the positive responsiveness property.
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that if a chosen alternative w improves in an agent’s preference but the preference
ordering for all other pairs where both alternatives in the pair are different from w
remains unchanged, then w must continue to be chosen in the modified profile. This
monotonicity requirement, as is often observed in several allocation models, is critical
for strategy-proofness.
Turning to the SNTV rule, it can be observed that its manipulability can be captured
through upwards manipulations since a successful manipulation results in getting an
alternative ranked outside of the top k alternatives (based on their plurality scores)
into the set of top k winning alternatives. We shall denote the respective (upper)
manipulable domains of the SNTV rule g(k)τ by U sk .
Proposition 4 Assume that m ≥ 3, n ≥ m + 2 and τ is a given tie-preserving tie-
breaking rule. Considering individual manipulability, the SNTV rule g(k)τ , where k =
1, . . . ,m − 2, has a smaller NKI on IC and AIC than the SNTV rule g(k+1)τ , where in
the AIC case anonymous tie-breaking rules have to be assumed.
Proof We construct an injection f : U sk → U sk+1. Pick an arbitrary profile  at which
the SNTV rule g(k)τ is manipulable. The heart of the proof is the proof of Proposition 1.
The three differences from the proof of Proposition 1 are the following ones:
– The situation of ties can be handled more easily since it does not matter whether
the alternative ai entering the top k or k + 1 alternatives in plurality scores by
the manipulation of voter q will just make it into the winning set or even better,
and therefore assuming tie-preserving tie-breaking rules without modifying τ to
τ ′ does the job.
– It still does not matter that |M(am)| will be ranked highest since it cannot loose
its top position by a single-voter manipulation.
– The definition ofDi reduces for the comparison of sets g(k)τ () = {a1, . . . , ak}
and g(k)τ (′j ,− j ) = {a1, . . . , al−1, ai , al+1, . . . , ak−1} to the comparison of
alternatives ai and ak by i , which is done in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3.

Note that the SNTV rule g(m)τ selects the set of all alternatives, and therefore a
statement analogous to Proposition 2 does not hold true.
4 Non-manipulable subdomains
In this section we determine non-manipulable domains for the plurality kth rules,
where we have to treat the plurality, the plurality kth with 1 < k < m and the reverse
plurality rules separately.
Lemma 1 A non-manipulable domain for the plurality rule for any tie-breaking rule
is given by
N1 =
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Furthermore,N1 is amaximal non-manipulable connected subdomain for the plurality
rule for any tie-breaking rule.
Proof Clearly, a voter ranking the plurality winner on top has no incentive to misrep-
resent its preference relation, while voters with other top alternatives can individually
only increase the votes of their lower ranked alternatives by the plurality rule by one.
Therefore, for any profile in N1 any feasible manipulation has to result in an equal
number of votes for the two leading alternatives based on their plurality scores in
the manipulated profile, which is impossible without leaving N1, and thereforeN1 is
non-manipulable.
We prove that N1 is a maximal connected non-manipulable domain (for any tie-
breaking rule). Note that N1 contains all unanimous profiles, that is all profiles in
which all voters have the same top alternative. Pick an arbitrary profile  such that
pτ (, 1) = pτ (, 2) > pτ (, 3) ≥ 0.5 Let a = rτ (, 1) and b = rτ (, 2). By the
definition of N1 there exists a profile ′∈ N1 such that −i=′−i and a ′i b for a
voter i ∈ N who has top alternative a ini and another top alternative c in′i . If b and
c get the same plurality scores at′, assume that bτ(′)c. Then voter i canmanipulate
profile ′ by revealing i instead of ′i , which implies thatN1 ∪ {} is manipulable.
Hence, we can conclude thatN1 is a maximal connected non-manipulable domain. 
It is worth mentioning that N1 determines an ‘improper’ decomposition by letting
N2 = . . . = Nm = ∅.
A non-manipulable domain can be given easily in an analogous way to Lemma 1,
which is also maximal in the sense that the differences in plurality scores cannot be
reduced further; however, it still can be extended by some profiles without violating
non-manipulability.
Lemma 2 A non-manipulable domain for the plurality kth rule, where k = 2, . . . ,m−
1, for any tie-breaking rule is given by
N uk =
{∈ Pn | pτ (, k − 1) − 2 ≥ pτ (, k) ≥ pτ (, k + 1) + 1
}
. (2)
Let L ∈ P be a given linear ordering of alternatives. Then
Nk =
{∈ Pn | pτ (, k − 1) − 1 = pτ (, k) ≥ pτ (, k + 1) + 1 and ∀i ∈ A :
pτ (, i) = pτ (, k − 1) ⇒ rτ (, i) L rτ (, k)} ∪ N uk (3)
is a maximal non-manipulable connected subdomain for the plurality kth rule for any
tie-breaking rule.6
Proof Taking downwards and upwards manipulations into account, a lead by at least
3 votes by the k − 1th ranked alternative over the kth ranked alternative and a lead
5 Let us remark that since we are looking for a maximal connected non-manipulable domain containingN1
more than two alternatives cannot have the highest plurality scores in a profile obtained by a manipulation
of a profile inN1.
6 The precondition of the implication of 3 in definitely true for i = k−1 and also holds for other alternatives
ak−l , . . . , ak−2 possibly tied with ak−1.
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by at least 2 votes by the kth ranked alternative over the k + 1th alternative makes
manipulations impossible. However, since by individual misrepresentation we cannot
leave N uk the differences for both downwards and upwards manipulations can be
reduced by 1 as formulated in (2), and thereforeN uk is indeed non-manipulable. Note
that the differences in plurality scores in (2) cannot be decreased ‘uniformly’ (i.e. for
all profiles) since reducing 2 to 1 in the first inequality wouldmake it possible to switch
a lead by one vote of the k − 1th alternative over the kth alternative into the opposite
direction without leaving the restricted subdomain and reducing 1 to 0 in the second
inequality obviously opens the door for manipulation. This is also the reason why we
can extendN uk (where superscript u stands for uniform) toNk without allowing space
for manipulation.
We prove that Nk is a maximal non-manipulable connected domain (for any tie-
breaking rule). First, pick an arbitrary profile  such that either pτ (, k − 1) − 2 ≥
pτ (, k) = pτ (, k + 1), or pτ (, k − 1) − 1 = pτ (, k) = pτ (, k + 1) and
rτ (, k − 1) L rτ (, k). Let a = rτ (, k), b = rτ (, k + 1) and c = rτ (, k − 1).
By the definition ofN uk there exists a profile ′∈ N uk such that −i=′−i and a ′i b
for a voter i ∈ N who has top alternative a in i and top alternative c in ′i . Then
voter i can manipulate profile ′ by revealing i instead of ′i , which implies that
Nk ∪ {} is (upwards) manipulable.
Second, pick an arbitrary profile  such that pτ (, k − 1) − 1 = pτ (, k) ≥
pτ (, k + 1) + 1 and /∈ Nk . Let a = rτ (, k − 1), b = rτ (, k) and c =
rτ (, k + 1). Choose a voter i with top alternative a in . Since /∈ Nk the pro-
file ′= (′i ,−i ) in which a voter i has top alternative b in ′i is in Nk . Hence, i
can manipulate  by revealing ′i .
Third, pick an arbitrary profile  such that pτ (, k − 1) = pτ (, k) >
pτ (, k + 1) + 1. Let a = rτ (, k − 1), b = rτ (, k) and c = rτ (, k + 1). Now
choose a voter i ∈ N with top alternative a. Clearly, voter i canmanipulate by reveal-
ing a preference relation ′i with top alternative b. In addition, ′= (′i ,−i ) ∈ Nk
since b leads by two votes over a and a still leads by at least one vote over c in ′.
Forth, pick an arbitrary profile  such that pτ (, k − 1) = pτ (, k) =
pτ (, k + 1) + 1. Let a = rτ (, k − 1), b = rτ (, k) and c = rτ (, k + 1).
Then to assure that Nk ∪ {} remains connected  has to be obtained by a misrep-
resentation of voter i such that for profile ′= (′i ,−i ) either (i) s(′, b) = s(′
, a) + 1 ≥ s(′, c) + 2 if bLa or (ii) s(′, a) = s(′, b) + 1 ≥ s(′, c) + 2 if aLb.
In case (i) b has to be the top alternative of ′i , while it is not the top alternative ofi . Therefore, i can manipulate ′ by revealing i . In case (ii) considering another
tie-breaking rule τ ′ that switches the positions of a and b at profile  leads to case (i).
Hence, we can conclude thatNk is a maximal connected non-manipulable domain.

Lemma 3 Anon-manipulable domain for the reverse plurality rule for any tie-breaking
rule is given by
N um =
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Let L ∈ P be a given linear ordering of alternatives. Then
Nm =
{∈ Pn | pτ (,m − 1) − 1 = pτ (,m) and ∀i ∈ A :
pτ (, i) = pτ (,m − 1) ⇒ rτ (, i) L rτ (,m)} ∪ N um (4)
is a maximal non-manipulable connected subdomain for the reverse plurality rule for
any tie-breaking rule.
Proof The proof can be done by repeating some parts of the proof of Lemma 2 related
to downwards manipulation for k = m since upwards manipulation is impossible. 
We formulate the following statement concerning themanipulability of the plurality
kth rule and that of the SNTV rule with k winners.
Lemma 4 Let us restrict ourselves to tie-order preserving tie-breaking rules. Then
if the plurality kth rule f (k)τ is upwards manipulable, then the SNTV rule g
(k)
τ is
manipulable. The opposite direction may fail in case of multiple ties from the k − j th
to the k + lth positions, where j, l ≥ 1. However, if the SNTV rule g(k)τ is manipulable
at a profile, then there exists a tie-order preserving tie-breaking rule τ ′ such that both
f (k)
τ ′ and g
(k)
τ ′ are manipulable at that profile.
Proof For a given profile  let ai = f (i)τ () for all i = 1, . . . ,m. If the plurality kth
rule is upwards manipulable at profile, then there exists a voter i such that a j i ak ,
j > k, ′i∈ P and f (k)τ (′i ,−i ) = a j , which in turn implies that g(k)τ (′i ,−i
) Li g(k)τ () since the alternatives a1, . . . , ak−1 remain the top k − 1 alternatives at
′= (′i ,−i ) and {a j } Li {ak}.
A manipulation by voter i of the SNTV rule for the given tie-breaking rule τ at
profile  by revealing ′i could move an alternative from the k + j th position to the
k − lth position without an improvement at the kth position for the manipulator, and
thus without a manipulation of the plurality kth rule. However, then either alternatives
ak−1 and ak are tied or not in both  and ′. In the former case, since there is no
improvement at the kth position (i.e. ak i ak−1)7, there exists a tie-breaking rule τ ′,
which reorders the tied alternatives ak−1 and ak at (i.e. prior to manipulation), while
in the latter case ak−l will be tied with ak−1 after the manipulation and let τ ′ reorder
these two alternatives at (′i ,−i ) (i.e. after manipulation). 
We also determine a maximal non-manipulable connected domain for the SNTV
rule.
Lemma 5 A non-manipulable domain for the SNTV rule choosing k winners, where
k = 2, . . . ,m − 1, for any tie-breaking rule is given by
N k =
{∈ Pn | pτ (, k) ≥ pτ (, k + 1) + 1
}
. (5)
Furthermore,N k is a maximal non-manipulable connected domain for the SNTV rule
choosing k winners for any tie-breaking rule.
7 Note that the manipulation of the SNTV rule by voter i cannot result in a decrease of the plurality scores
of alternatives a1, . . . , ak .
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Proof One has to employ the parts of the proof of Lemma 2 related to upwards manip-
ulation. 
From the proof of Lemma 2 it also follows that if we restrict ourselves to upwards
manipulations of the plurality kth rule, thenwe also obtainN k as themaximal upwards
non-manipulable domain for the plurality kth rule.
5 A decomposition with a corollary
Observe that any SCF f : Pn → A can be decomposed into plurality kth rules, that
is there exists Xk ⊆ Pn (k = 1, . . . ,m) such that
– ∪mk=1Xk = Pn ,
– Xk ∩ Xl = ∅ if k = l, and
– f|Xk = f (k)|Xk .
We illustrate a decomposition by the following example.
Example 1 Let m = 4, n = 3 and the tie-breaking rule τ equaling the constant tie-
breaking rule given by the fixed ordering aτbτcτd. Let f Bτ be the Borda count with
tie-breaking rule τ .






we have f Bτ = f (2)τ , that is on the above profile  the Borda winner equals with the
choice of the plurality 2nd rule. Clearly, on unanimous profiles the Borda count equals
the plurality rule. We do not list a partition of the 46656 profiles for m = 4 and n = 3
determining the profiles on which the Borda count is equal to a given plurality kth
rule.
From the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (1973/75) we know that only the dic-
tatorial SFCs are non-manipulable and onto in case of at least three alternatives.
Therefore, our aim with the above described decomposition is to obtain a maximal
non-manipulable subdomain of Pn . Plurality kth rules are especially helpful since the
room for manipulation by an individual is extremely small since it can just increase
the received votes of an alternative by just one and decrease the received votes of an
other alternative by just one, thus keeping our analysis as simple as possible.
In order to arrive to a non-manipulable subdomain we have to find disjoint subdo-
mains N1,N2, . . . ,Nm on which the plurality first, the plurality second, and so on
rules will be employed. Our strategy will be to assure that manipulation within anyNk
becomes impossible and none of the voters can move by an individual misrepresenta-
tion a profile fromNi to anotherN j . Note that whileNi is connected, their union will
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Table 3 A decomposition for
m = 3 and n = 15 Rank N
′
1 N ′2 N ′3
1st 13 12 11 11 10 9 9 8 8 7 7
2nd 2 3 4 3 4 4 6 7 5 6 5
3rd 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 2 3
be disconnected. For simplicity we start with the case in which the non-manipulability
on N = N1 ∪ . . . ∪ Nm ⊂ Pn has to hold for any tie-breaking rule.
From Lemmas 1–3 it follows that N ′ = ∩mi=1Nm is non-manipulable for any
plurality kth rule, which in itself is a trivial observation; however, it just does not
allow manipulation for those subdomains of N ′ on which the plurality kth rule is
employed, but admits manipulations by moving from a profile in Ni to a profile in
N j . Therefore, a slightly more sophisticated construction to arrive to a partition of a
subdomain of∪mi=1Nm is needed to employ several plurality kth rules at the same time
with a non-manipulable subdomain.
From the lessons of Lemmas 1–3 we construct a non-manipulable subdomain,
with appropriately defined subdomains N ′i on which the plurality kth rules will be
employed, respectively.8 Clearly, if we would take the non-manipulable domain from
Lemma 1, we could not introduce the other plurality kth rules into our decomposition.
We know that a safe difference in plurality scores for the plurality rule is 1 downwards,
while for the other plurality kth rules 2 and 1 upwards and downwards, respectively.
If we relax our assumption on the plurality rule and require a larger difference in the
plurality scores of the top two alternatives, thenwewill give room for the other plurality
kth rules. This is the reason for the relaxed condition pτ (, 1)− pτ (, 2) ≥ 5 in the
definition of N ′1 in the upcoming Proposition 5. We can see similar conditions in the
definitions of N ′k for all k = 2, . . . , l, i.e. pτ (, k) − pτ (, k + 1) ≥ 6. The other
inequalities guarantee that N ′i and N ′j are disjoint if i = j .
We present a motivating example in Table 3 before stating Proposition 5. The
columns of Table 3 express the distribution of the 15 voters according to the numbers
of first, second and third ranked alternatives. Each column gathers many prefer-
ences. In addition, the underlying preferences are grouped into the three possible
non-manipulable subdomains. As it can be seen, the first ranked alternatives by the
profiles inN ′1 have a large lead over their second ranked alternatives, in particular, they
have a lead of at least five top positions. The difference in the number of top positions
between the second and third ranked alternatives lie between 2 and 4. From this we
can immediately see that manipulation within N ′1 is not possible. Turning to N ′2, we
can see differences in the number of top positions of at least six between the second
and third alternatives, whereas the differences in top positions between the first and
second ranked alternatives lie between 1 and 3. It follows thatN ′2 is non-manipulable.
Looking at N ′3, the differences in the number of top positions between the first and
second ranked and between the second and third ranked alternatives lie between 1 and
3 and between 2 and 4, respectively. Obviously, N ′3 is non-manipulable. Finally, it is
8 It is worthwhile to mention that there are multiple ways for coming up with a decomposition utilizing all
plurality kth rules.
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impossible to move from a preference relation in N ′i to a preference relation in N ′j ,
where i = j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, by a single-voter manipulation.
Proposition 5 Let l < m and
N ′1 =
{∈ Pn | pτ (, 1) − pτ (, 2) ≥ 5
4 ≥ pτ (, i) − pτ (, i + 1) ≥ 2 for all i = 2, . . . l} ,
N ′k =
{∈ Pn | 3 ≥ pτ (, 1) − pτ (, 2) ≥ 1
pτ (, k) − pτ (, k + 1) ≥ 6
4 ≥ pτ (, i) − pτ (, i + 1) ≥ 2 for all i = 2, . . . l and i = k} ,
N ′l+1 =
{∈ Pn | 3 ≥ pτ (, 1) − pτ (, 2) ≥ 1
4 ≥ pτ (, i) − pτ (, i + 1) ≥ 2 for all i = 2, . . . l} ,
where k = 2, . . . , l. Assuming that the plurality kth rule is employed on N ′k , the
subdomain N = ∪l+1i=1Ni is non-manipulable for any tie-breaking rule for the just
defined SCF on N .
Proof Lemmas 1–3 imply that the subdomains N ′k are non-manipulable and the con-
struction of N ′1, . . . ,N ′l+1 assures that changing the preference relation of a single
voter does not allow to us to move a profile from N ′i to another N ′j . 
Our next proposition utilizes our decomposition and the derived non-manipulable
domains for plurality kth rules.
Proposition 6 Let X1, . . . ,Xm be a decomposition into plurality kth rules of SCF
f : Pn → A and let Mk = Xk ∩ N ′k for any k = 1, . . . ,m. Then M = ∪mi=1Mi is
a non-manipulable domain for f .
Though the statement of Proposition 6 is straightforward, we think that its result
is surprising since it means that for a subdomain of preference profiles for which
the plurality scores of the alternatives cannot be too close the respective SCF is
non-manipulable. Hence, based on a simple statement on plurality scores and the
decomposition of an arbitrary SCF we can arrive to a non-manipulable domain of that
SCF.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have introduced plurality kth rules and investigated their individual
and group manipulability (the latter in the “Appendix”). For larger k the plurality kth
rule is manipulable on more profiles. Any social choice function can be expressed as a
‘combination’ of plurality kth rules, which employed for providing non-manipulable
domains for any social choice function. We established connections between the plu-
rality kth rules and the SNTV rule.
Investigating Borda kth rules or more generally scoring kth methods, could be
a direction of possible future extensions of this work. Capturing the manipulability
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of plurality k rules is definitely simpler than, for instance, obtaining similar results
for Borda kth rules. The growing literature on multi-winner elections serves as a
motivation for these type of extensions.
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Appendix: Groupmanipulability
Concerning groupmanipulability, we obtain an evenmore negative result since for any
plurality kth rule, with the exception of the plurality rule, there exists a tie-breaking
rule such that it is group manipulable at any profile. However, if we require group
manipulability for any tie-breaking rule, then the reverse-plurality rule remains the
only one that can be manipulated at any profile.
We define below the group manipulability of SCFs. Consider a preference profile
(1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn .
Definition 9 An SCF f : Pn → A is group manipulable by a non-empty set of voters
M ⊆ N at (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn if for all i ∈ M ,
∃ ′i∈ P such that f (′M ,−M ) i f (M ,−M ).
An SCF f : Pn → A is group manipulable at (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn if there exists a
non-empty set of voters M ⊆ N who can manipulate f .
First, we start with a result showing that the reverse-plurality rule is extremely
vulnerable to group manipulation.
Proposition 7 There exists an anonymous tie-breaking rule for which the reverse-
plurality rule is group manipulable at any profile with n ≥ 2.
Proof Pick a profile (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn and an ordering a1, a2, . . . , am of the alterna-
tives such that |Ma1 | ≤ |Ma2 | ≤ · · · ≤ |Mam |. Choose an ai = a1 for which |Mai | > 0
and then a tie-breaking τ in which a1 has the highest priority and ai the second highest
priority. Then the reverse-plurality rule f ∗τ selects alternative a1 and the group Mai of
voters can manipulate by all of them switching to preferences with a1 on the top. 
From the proof of Proposition 7 we can see that the tie-breaking rule has to be set
in a specific way for being able to group manipulate at profile  if and only if there
are at least two alternatives receiving zero vote. The next proposition shows that we
need exactly at least a certain number of voters such that we do not need to care about
the tie-breaking rule.
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Proposition 8 The reverse-plurality rule is group manipulable for any tie-breaking
rule at any profile if and only if for odd m we have n > (m − 1)2/4 and for even m
we have n > (m2 − 2m)/4.
Proof Pick a profile (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn and an ordering a1, a2, . . . , am of the alter-
natives such that |Ma1 | ≤ |Ma2 | ≤ · · · ≤ |Mam |.
Observe in the proof of Proposition 7 we needed to set a tie-breaking rule because
it might be the case that in profile (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn at least two alternatives are
not a top alternative of any voter and then for any other profile the proof would
work for any tie-breaking rule. Hence, we can restrict ourselves to profiles for which
|Ma1 | = |Ma2 | = 0. Let k = max{ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | |Maj | = 0}. Note that if
|Mal | ≥ k, then the voters in Mal can manipulate by choosing alternatives a1, . . . , ak
as the set of their top alternatives. Suppose that (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn is non-manipulable
in the described way, then wemust have n ≤ (m−k)(k−1) since all of the alternatives
being a top alternative of somebody can be at most k − 1 times on the top. Expression
(m − k)(k − 1) is maximized in k at k = (m + 1)/2 if m is odd, and at k = m/2
or k = m/2 + 1 if m is even. Then we must have n ≤ n∗o = (m − 1)2/4 and
n ≤ n∗e = (m2 − 2m)/4, respectively, to make a manipulation of the described type
infeasible.
Finally, we show that the bounds on n are tight, that is for any profile with at most n∗o
or at most n∗e voters there exist profiles and tie-breaking rules such that manipulation is
not possible. Let k be the value determined in the above paragraph separately for odd
and evenm. Then pick a profile in which 0 < |Mal | ≤ k−1 for any l ∈ {k+1, . . . ,m}
and in any of the preferences with al on the top the alternatives a1, . . . , ak are ranked
above the top alternatives of the other voters ({ak+1, . . . , am} \ {al}), and pick the
tie-breaking rule preferring alternatives having smaller indices to alternatives having
larger indices. Clearly, any group of voters Mal , where l > k, cannot manipulate
without cooperating with voters from other groups. However, such cooperations are
not viable based on our tie-breaking rule because each of them prefer the first k
alternatives to the top alternatives of the other ones. 
We can see from Proposition 8 that the price for maintaining the group manipulability
of the reverse-plurality rule at any profile for any fixed tie-breaking rule is quite low
since the requiredminimal number of voters is fairly small in the number of alternatives
and is usually satisfied in real-life voting situations.
The result of Proposition 7 can be extended to the plurality kth rules with the
exception of the plurality rule.
Proposition 9 For any k = 2, . . . ,m − 1 there exists an anonymous tie-breaking rule
for which the plurality kth rule is group manipulable at any profile with n ≥ 2.
Proof Pick a profile  = (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn and pick an ordering a1, a2, . . . , am of
the alternatives such that |Ma1 | ≥ |Ma2 | ≥ · · · ≥ |Mam |. Choose τ() in a way that
makes ak the kth ranked alternative in profile . Let  = |Ma1 | − |Mak |.
If  > 0, then construct profile ′ from  by changing the preference relations of
 voters from Ma1 to preference relations with ak on the top. Select τ(
′) such that
a1 becomes the kth ranked alternative in profile ′. Then the respective voters can
group manipulate.
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If = 0, then to obtain profile′ from just change the preference relation of one
voter in M(a1) to another preference relation still having a1 on the top, but ordering
the other alternatives differently. Select τ(′) such that a1 becomes the kth ranked
alternative in profile ′. Then the respective voter can manipulate. It is worthwhile
mentioning that these changes can be done consistently by considering profiles in
which |Ma1 | = · · · = |Mak | and taking an appropriate circular ordering of these
profiles. 
Our next proposition shows that surprisingly the selection of a tie-breaking rule in
Proposition 9 plays a central role since we cannot maintain group manipulability at
any profile for any tie-breaking rule even if we have sufficiently many voters for the
plurality kth rules with the exceptions of the reverse-plurality rule. From another point
of view an analogous statement to Proposition 8 does not hold for the plurality kth
rules, where 1 ≤ k < m.
Proposition 10 For any k = 1, . . . ,m − 1 there exists a tie-breaking rule and there
exist profiles on which the plurality kth rule is not group manipulable.
Proof For any k = 2, . . . ,m − 1 we provide a tie-breaking rule and a profile at
which the plurality kth rule is not group manipulable. We consider profiles satisfying
|Ma1 | ≥ |Ma2 | ≥ · · · ≥ |Mak+1 | ≥ 0 = |Mak+2 | = · · · = |Mam | and |Ma1 | almost
equals |Mak+1 | by which we mean that |Ma1 | − |Mak+1 | ≤ 1. In case of possible
ties the tie-breaking rule has to select ak as the plurality kth winner. We restrict our
set of investigated profiles even further by requiring that ak should be the second
ranked alternative in the orderings of voters not in Mak . For these type of profiles a
group of voters manipulates only if it can make the top alternative of its voters the
plurality kth winner, which implies that voters with different top alternatives do not
cooperate. If at least two voters in Mai reveal another top alternative, then there will
be at least k alternatives receiving more votes than ai and the misrepresentation will
not be beneficial. If only one voter in Mai reveals a different top alternative, then ai
can have the kth most vote only in a tie. If in this case the tie-breaking rule is set in a
way that alternative ai cannot win, then the plurality kth rule is not group manipulable
at this profile.
For the plurality rule consider, for instance, unanimous profiles (i.e N = Ma1 ),
which are not group manipulable even for any tie-breaking rule. 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